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Confidence is the ‘feeling of knowing’ that accompanies decision making and guides 
processes such as learning, error detection, and inter-personal communication. 
Bayesian theory proposes that confidence is a function of the probability that a 
decision is correct given the evidence.  Empirical research has shown, however, that 
humans tend to report confidence in very different ways. This idiosyncratic behaviour 
suggests that different individuals may perform different computations to estimate 
confidence from uncertain evidence. We tested this hypothesis by collecting 
confidence reports from healthy adults making decisions under either visual or 
numerical uncertainty. We found that for most individuals, confidence did indeed reflect 
the perceived probability of being correct. However, in approximately half of them, 
confidence also reflected a different probabilistic quantity: the observed Fisher 
information. We isolated the influence of each of these two quantities on confidence, 
and found that this decomposition is stable across weeks, and consistent across tasks 
involving uncertainty in both perceptual and cognitive domains. Our findings provide, 
for the first time, a mechanistic interpretation of individual differences in the human 
sense of confidence.  
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Introduction 
Understanding the computational basis of individual differences in human cognition has 
fundamental implications for medical and biological sciences as well as for economics and 
social sciences. A prime example is confidence, which plays a key role in a wide range of 
aspects in life, including learning to make better decisions1, monitoring our actions2, 
cooperating effectively with others3, 4, and displaying good political judgment5. One of the most 
intriguing features of confidence is that humans tend to communicate this feeling in a largely 
idiosyncratic way: although confidence reports are typically stable within each person, they 
tend to be variable across the population6, 7. For instance, different individuals performing the 
same task generate distributions of confidence ratings with different mean and shape7. In 
addition, the correlation between confidence and objective performance varies for different 
people, and is related to individual variations in brain structure8 and connectivity9, 10. While a 
vast literature has focused on the biological correlates of individual differences in human 
confidence8-10, the computational roots of this phenomenon remain unclear.  
Previous research in sensory psychophysics8, 11 and value-based decision making10, 
assumed that confidence is a function solely of the perceived probability of being correct. This 
assumption is reasonable: confidence should only reflect this subjective probability12-14. 
However, based on this normative framework, previous studies explained differences between 
people as measurement noise15, or as individual differences in the ability to reflect the 
probability of being correct8, 9. This may have been an oversimplification: there is extensive 
literature showing that confidence can be influenced by factors other than the probability of 
being correct16, such as the reliability of sensory stimuli2, 13, the magnitude of sensory data11, 
post-decisional biases17, and even personality traits7. 
Here we set out to determine what probabilistic quantities, besides perceived 
probability of being correct, contribute to individual differences in human confidence. We 
focused on a categorical task, in which subjects had to decide whether the average of a set 
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of items was above or below a decision boundary, and then report their confidence. For about 
half of the subjects, confidence did depend solely on the perceived probability that they were 
correct. However, for the other half, confidence also depended on a different statistical 
quantity: the inverse variance, which we refer to as the observed Fisher information18, 19 (to 
avoid ambiguity associated with other terms used previously such as “certainty”14 or 
“precision”1). Moreover, the dependence of confidence on the perceived probability of being 
correct and the Fisher information was stable across experiments performed weeks apart. 
Finally, we show that the dependence of confidence on the perceived probability of being 
correct was stable across tasks involving uncertainty in the perceptual and cognitive domain, 
but the dependence on Fisher information was not. This is consistent with the predictions of a 
recent theoretical account arguing that Fisher information is encoded by domain-specific 
neural populations14. Overall, these findings provide a mechanistic interpretation of individual 
differences in the human sense of confidence.  
Results 
In the perceptual task (Experiment 1), participants observed a sequence of 30 tilted Gabor 
patches presented at the fovea in rapid (4 Hz) serial visual presentation (Fig.1a). At the end 
of the sequence, participants decided whether the mean orientation of the patches was 
clockwise or counter-clockwise relative to vertical. Participants then reported how confident 
they were in their decision on a scale from 1 to 6. To manipulate uncertainty, we pseudo-
randomly drew the orientation samples from uniform distributions with exactly the same mean 
(+3 degrees or -3 degrees) but different variances on different trials (Fig. 1b). Participants 
performed better as variance decreased (Fig. 1c, one-way repeated measures ANOVA, 
F(3,29)=231.4, p<10-10).  
To fit the choices of each participant, we assumed that they keep track of the mean 
orientation, which they update after each stimulus presentation. To update their estimate of 
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      [1] 
the mean, we considered a model in which participants combine a noisy estimate of the current 
sample with their previous estimate of the mean,  
𝜇𝑖 = (1 − 𝜆) 𝜇𝑖−1 + 𝜆 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾 𝜃𝑖𝜉𝑖  
where 𝜇𝑖 is the estimate of the mean after 𝑖 samples (𝜇0 = 0), 0 < 𝜆 < 1 determines the 
relative weighting of recent versus more distant samples, 𝜃𝑖 is the actual orientation of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ 
sample in the sequence,  𝜉𝑖 is sampled from the standard normal distribution, and 𝛾 is a free 
parameter indicating the strength of the noise. The multiplicative nature of the noise ensures 
that the uncertainty in the update of the estimate scales with the size of the observed sample, 
𝜃𝑖, as has been observed in numerous domains, including visual perception
20, numerical 
cognition21, and the perception of time22. At the end of the sequence, choice is determined by 
the sign of the final value of the mean (𝜇30): the agent chooses clockwise if 𝜇30 is positive, and 
counter-clockwise if 𝜇30 is negative.  
We also tested an alternative model that tracks the mean of the sequence in a 
deterministic way, and then makes stochastic decisions. This model, however, failed to explain 
the trend in Fig. 1c, which shows that performance increases as variance decreases (see 
Supplementary Fig. 1 for details and model comparison).  
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Figure 1. Tracking mean evidence in rapid serial visual presentations. (a) 30 tilted Gabor patches were serially 
flashed at the fovea, updated at 4 Hz. Participants made a binary decision about whether the mean in the sequence 
was tilted to the right or left, followed by a confidence rating. Full details of the task are available in Online Methods. 
(b) The samples were drawn from a uniform distribution with mean, m, set to either exactly +3 degrees or exactly 
-3 degrees. The dashed line shows m=+3. The endpoints of the uniform distributions were m±v, with v = 10, 14, 
24, or 45 degrees, yielding four conditions with four different variances. (c) Performance increased with decreasing 
variance. Dots show the grand-average performance, and vertical lines depict the s.e.m. The solid black curve 
shows the best fit of the stochastic updating model (Equations [1] and [2]). (d) Confidence reports averaged over 
all subjects. Vertical lines show s.e.m. At the population level, confidence in incorrect trials remains approximately 
constant as a function of variance. 
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      [2] 
Computation of confidence 
To compute confidence, participants need to have an estimate of the variance of 𝜇30. We 
assumed that they are able to compute the true variance associated with Equation [1]. Thus, 
perceived variance, denoted 𝜎30
2 , is given by 
𝜎30
2 = 𝛾2 ∑(1 − 𝜆)2(30−𝑖)
30
𝑖=1
𝜃𝑖
2. 
The model described by Equations [1] and [2], which we call the stochastic updating model, is 
illustrated in the left two panels of Fig. 2a. Given 𝜇30 and 𝜎30
2 , subjects can compute, on each 
trial, the perceived probability of being correct, ?̂?(correct) (shaded area under the Gaussian 
distribution in Fig. 2a). Participants can also compute the Fisher information using 𝜎30
2  (top 
right panel in Fig. 2a).  
Using this model, we estimated the expected values of ?̂?(correct) and Fisher 
information for different variance conditions, separated by correct and incorrect trials (see 
Online Methods, Equation [9], and Fig. 2b,c). On correct trials, both quantities increase with 
decreasing variance (solid grey lines in Figs. 2b and 2c), as does confidence (Fig. 1d). If we 
had access only to correct trials, we would not know whether confidence was influenced by 
perceived probability of being correct or Fisher information. However, on error trials, these two 
quantities show opposite trends: ?̂?(correct) decreases with decreasing variance while Fisher 
information increases (dashed black lines in Figs. 2b and 2c). Confidence in errors, on the 
other hand, was relatively independent of variance (F(3,29)=0.57, p=0.63). One explanation of 
this phenomenon is that participants base confidence on both their perceived probability of 
being correct and, as a heuristic, the observed Fisher information. If confidence were an 
increasing function of both ?̂?(correct) and Fisher information, and subjects weighted them 
approximately equally, confidence could be a relatively flat function of variance on incorrect 
trials (Fig. 1d), and at the same time could increase with decreasing variance on correct trials. 
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Figure 2. Estimating confidence. (a) Each trial consists of 30 presentations of tilted Gabor patches. At each 
presentation (𝜃𝑖) the mean (𝜇𝑖) is updated by combining the estimate on the previous sample with a noisy version 
of the current Gabor patch. The black line represents one realisation of the model. At the end of the sequence, the 
subject makes a decision based on the sign of 𝜇30. The subjective probability of being correct and the observed 
Fisher information are then computed according to the equations shown in the right panel; see Online Methods for 
full details. (b) The perceived probability of being correct, ?̂?(correct), averaged over variance condition for correct 
trials (solid grey line) and incorrect trials (dashed black line), and also averaged across participants. For correct 
trials, this quantity increases with decreasing variance (solid grey line); for incorrect trials it shows the opposite 
pattern (dashed black line). (c) Observed Fisher information increases both for correct and incorrect trials (same 
markers as panel b).  
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The analysis presented so far is based on population-averaged data (Fig. 1d), so it is 
uninformative about differences among individuals. To determine whether, and how, 
?̂?(correct) and Fisher information influence confidence within subjects, we looked at the data 
of each individual. As expected6, 7, we observed substantial inter-individual differences (Fig. 
3). Some subjects did indeed base confidence solely on ?̂?(correct). However, in approximately 
half of them, confidence appeared to be influenced – at least to some degree – by Fisher 
information. To quantify this, we regressed23 confidence reports against model-based 
estimates of ?̂?(correct) and information. Fig. 3 shows a scatter plot of the regression weights 
for ?̂?(correct) and Fisher information. In 13 out of the 30 participants, confidence significantly 
reflected ?̂?(correct) but not information. In 14 other participants, however, confidence 
significantly reflected both ?̂?(correct) and information. One participant’s confidence conveyed 
only information but not ?̂?(correct), and finally, for two participants, confidence did not reflect 
either of the two quantities.  
 
 
 
 
(which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission. 
The copyright holder for this preprint. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/102269doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Jan. 22, 2017; 
10 
 
 
Figure 3. Analysis of confidence across individuals. The main panel in the lower left shows regression weights on 
confidence for different individuals. x-axis: weight of the probability of being correct (𝛽𝑝); y-axis: weight of 
information (𝛽𝐼). Each dot is a different participant, and the colour codes for significance (at the 0.05 level) as 
follows: dark green, only 𝛽𝑝 was significant; light green, both 𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝐼 were significant; yellow, only 𝛽𝐼 was 
significant; grey, neither was significant. Insets along the top and right margins show average confidence and 
confidence distributions for four representative participants. Left plots: mean confidence across different variance 
conditions, split by correct (solid grey line) and incorrect (dashed black line) trials. Right plots: probability distribution 
over confidence. For participant #19 (yellow dot), confidence reflected only information: confidence increased with 
variance for incorrect trials. For participant #16 (dark green dot), confidence reflected only the perceived probability 
of being correct: confidence in error trials decreased with increasing variance. For participant #27 (light green dot), 
confidence reflected a mixture of both computations. For participant #24 (grey dot), confidence was not modulated 
by either of these quantities.  
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Stability across time 
The regression model identified seven parameters for each individual (see Online Methods, 
Equation [10]): a weight for ?̂?(correct), denoted 𝛽𝑝; a weight for information, denoted 𝛽𝐼; and 
five parameters 𝛼𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … ,5). The latter are the average log odds of observing a confidence 
rating greater than 𝑗; from these we selected the mid-value, 𝛼3, which is based on splitting the 
confidence scale in halves. The parameter 𝛼3 was correlated with the average confidence 
across the entire experiment (r=0.84, p<10-8), and so indicates how under- or overconfident a 
given participant is; we thus refer to 𝛼3 as the average confidence. We confirmed that 
individual differences in these parameters (𝛽𝑝,𝛽𝐼, and 𝛼3) are not simply explained by how well 
our model fit decisions (see Online Methods). The regression weights, 𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝐼, were 
correlated with measures of confidence used in previous studies: 𝛽𝑝 was correlated with how 
well confidence predicted accuracy, and 𝛽𝐼 was correlated with the subjects’ ability to 
discriminate different variances (see Online Methods). The three selected variables were 
uncorrelated with each other across the population (r<0.35, p>0.1 for all pairwise comparisons 
between 𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝐼, and 𝛼3).  
This analysis would be no more than a model-fitting exercise if a different profile – that 
is, a different relationship between confidence, ?̂?(correct), and Fisher information – emerged 
when the same participants were retested. To test for stability, in Experiment 2 we retested 
14 of the participants from Experiment 1 approximately one month later. We observed that the 
three variables (𝛽𝑝,𝛽𝐼,𝛼3) were correlated across experiments (Fig. 4), indicating that this 
decomposition is stable across time and informative of the identity of the participants. To 
further validate this observation, we found that the distance in the 3-dimensional space defined 
by (𝛽𝑝,𝛽𝐼,𝛼3) within participants (across the two experiments) was smaller than the distance 
between different participants within an experiment (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z=4.0, p<10-4).  
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Figure 4. Stability across time. 14 participants of Experiment 1 were retested about a month later (35.2±2.4 days; 
range = 23-49 days). We probed stability by asking how much our three parameters (𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝐼 and 𝛼3) changed across 
experiments. (a-c) Correlation across experiments for 𝛽𝑝 (a), 𝛽𝐼 (b), and 𝛼3 (c). Each square is a different 
participant, the dotted line is the identity, and the value of r given in each box is the Pearson correlation coefficient. 
The three variables were significantly correlated across experiments, suggesting that this decomposition is stable 
across time. A non-parametric method to measure rank correlation across experiments yielded similar results 
(Spearman’s rank correlation, rs=0.82, p<0.001 for 𝛽𝑝, rs=0.54, p<0.05 for 𝛽𝐼, and rs=0.55, p<0.05 for 𝛼3). 
 
Consistency across tasks  
To determine whether subjects compute confidence the same way across tasks – that is, 
whether they give the same weight to ?̂?(correct) and Fisher information, and have the same 
average confidence – we repeated our experiments on a cognitive task: averaging a sequence 
of numbers. In Experiment 3, a new group of 20 participants performed, in counterbalanced 
order, the visual task described above and a numerical averaging task (Fig. 5). In the 
numerical task, we presented two-digit numbers, updated at the same rate as in Experiment 
1 (4 Hz). The task was to decide whether the mean of the sequence was greater or smaller 
than 50. Uncertainty was manipulated in the same way as in Experiment 1, but using different 
ranges to ensure comparable performance across tasks (see Online Methods for details).  
In both tasks, accuracy increased with decreasing variance (Fig. 5a,b). A two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA with factors “variance” and “task” showed a significant main effect 
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of variance (F(3,19)=194.3, p<10-10) but a non-significant effect of task (F(1,19)=2.5, p=0.13) or 
interaction (F(3,19)=0.84, p=0.47). Importantly, replicating Experiment 1, variance did not 
modulate confidence in error decisions (F(3,19)=0.2, p=0.89 for the visual task; F(3,19)=1.1, p=0.4 
for the numerical task). Confidence in the visual task was not statistically different from 
confidence in the numerical task (F(1,19)=1.58, p=0.22, Fig. 5c,d). Decisions in both tasks were 
better fit by the stochastic updating model (Equations [1] and [2]) than the same alternative 
model we considered in the visual task (log-likelihood of the difference against zero: t(19)=5.2, 
p<10-4 for the cognitive task; t(19)=6.4, p<10-5 for the perceptual task), and our model-based 
analysis of confidence found similar results to Experiment 1 (see Supplementary Figs. 2 and 
3).  
 
 
Figure 5. Decisions and confidence in Experiment 3 (N=20). (a,c): Visual task (replication of Experiment 1 with 
different participants; panel a corresponds to Fig. 1c and panel c to Fig. 1d). (b) Same as (a), but for the numerical 
task. (d) Same as (c), but for the numerical task. The similarity between panels a and b, and between panels c 
and d, indicate that, at least on average, the visual and numerical tasks lead to remarkably similar behaviour, 
despite the fact that one is perceptual and the other is cognitive.  
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We asked if our three regressors were consistent across the numerical and visual 
tasks. The within-participants distance in the 3-dimensional space was smaller than the 
between-participants distance (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z=3.3, p<0.001). The contribution of 
?̂?(correct), 𝛽𝑝 (r=0.74, p<0.001) and trait confidence 𝛼3 (r=0.63, p<0.01) were significantly 
correlated across tasks. However, the weights of information, 𝛽𝐼, were uncorrelated across 
tasks (r=0.20, p=0.37), indicating that Fisher information has quantitatively different effects on 
confidence in visual and numerical tasks (Fig. 6). This result is in agreement with a recent 
theoretical account arguing that the inverse variance is represented by domain-specific neural 
populations14 (see Discussion).  
 
 
Figure 6. Consistency across tasks involving uncertainty in the perceptual and cognitive domain. 20 participants 
that were not tested in Experiments 1 or 2 performed one visual and one numerical task (Experiment 3). As in Fig. 
3, we decomposed confidence in terms of the weight of ?̂?(correct) (𝛽𝑝), the weight of information (𝛽𝐼), and the 
average confidence (𝛼3). (a-c) Correlation across tasks for 𝛽𝑝 (a), 𝛽𝐼 (b), and 𝛼3 (c). Each square is a different 
participant, the dotted line is the identity, and the value of r given in each box indicates the Pearson correlation 
coefficient. 𝛽𝑐 and 𝛼3 were positively correlated across tasks; however, the weights of Fisher information, 𝛽𝐼, were 
uncorrelated across tasks. A non-parametric method to measure the correlation across experiments yielded similar 
results (rs=0.68, p<0.01 for 𝛽𝑝, rs=0.22, p=0.35 for 𝛽𝐼, and rs=0.62, p<0.01 for 𝛼3). 
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Discussion 
The computations underlying confidence have attracted considerable attention over the last 
several years, in part due to recent developments in model-based approaches12-14 combined 
with neurophysiological recordings in non-human animals24-26 and neuroimaging in humans8-
10, 27. The standard approach consists of fitting a model to the entire population and treating 
inter-individual variability as noise11, 15. However, if such individual differences are robust over 
time, and consistent across tasks7, then treating them as noise limits our understanding of the 
computational processes underlying confidence. Here we found that inter-individual 
differences in confidence ratings are meaningful in terms of their underlying computations. In 
particular, we found that different individuals used different weightings for two probabilistic 
quantities: their perceived probability of being correct, and their certainty in their estimate of 
the task-relevant variable14, the latter quantified by the observed Fisher information18, 19. We 
isolated the contribution of each of these two quantities to confidence, and measured, for each 
individual: 1) the influence of the perceived probability of being correct on confidence (𝛽𝑝), 2) 
the influence of Fisher information on confidence (𝛽𝐼), and 3) the participants’ average 
confidence (𝛼3). All three variables were stable across several weeks (Fig. 4), and two of them 
(𝛽𝑝 and 𝛼3) were stable across different tasks – one in the perceptual domain; the other in the 
cognitive domain (Fig. 6).  
Previous research has shown reliable individual differences in the mean and shape of 
the distribution of confidence ratings6, 7, and in the extent to which confidence predicts 
behavioural accuracy7, 8.  These properties are believed to be idiosyncratic and correlate with 
individual variations in personality trait7, brain structure8, and resting-state functional 
connectivity9. For example, individual differences in the correlation between confidence and 
accuracy were systematically linked to a frontal network including the anterior prefrontal 
cortex, ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, and rostro-lateral prefrontal cortex8, 10, 28, 29. These 
findings were based on decisions in a wide range of contexts, including visual8 and value-
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based10 choices. Although these studies provided interesting insights about the brain regions 
that correlate with individual differences in confidence, none of them explicitly asked what 
probabilistic quantities influence this variability. In parallel, theoretical accounts have 
formalised a definition of confidence as the perceived probability of being correct12-15, but 
without looking at individual differences. Here, we provide the first empirical evidence that the 
idiosyncratic nature of confidence is due to differences in the computation of confidence; more 
specifically, different individuals place different weighting on the perceived probability of being 
correct and the observed Fisher information. 
In categorical tasks like ours, confidence should depend solely on the probability of 
being correct. So why does Fisher information affect confidence? We speculate that Fisher 
information, which is a useful measure of uncertainty in continuous quantities1, 2, 13, could serve 
as a mental shortcut that provides a proxy for the probability of being correct. This shortcut is 
reasonable, as Fisher information correlates with performance accuracy in our experiments 
(Figs. 1c and 2c). Previous research in our group showed that interacting dyads do take 
shortcuts: they communicate a confidence signal that is close to, yet different from, the 
probability of being correct3. Similarly, we previously found that confidence can reflect the 
magnitude of sensory data11, a choice-independent quantity that also correlates with 
behavioural performance. Our finding that a heuristic, such as Fisher information, modulates 
confidence judgements about categorical decisions is in line with these studies. 
Predictions for neural data 
Because the probability of being correct is a dimensionless quantity, and is universal across 
different sources of uncertainty, it could be encoded by a domain-general circuitry – for 
instance, by neurons in the prefrontal cortex8, 10, 28, 29. In contrast, Fisher information is a 
quantity with dimension, and so is presumably encoded by domain-specific populations14. For 
example, in the case of the visual task, certainty could be represented by neurons in primary 
visual cortex that are tuned to orientation30; and indeed, sensory uncertainty can be decoded 
from activity in the visual cortex31. In the same manner, numerical certainty could be 
(which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission. 
The copyright holder for this preprint. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/102269doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Jan. 22, 2017; 
17 
 
represented by neurons in the parietal cortex tuned to different numerical quantities32, 
although this has not yet been tested.  
An implication of our findings is that neurons representing confidence should receive 
input both from populations encoding the perceived probability of being correct and from 
populations encoding Fisher information. Consequently, because of differences in functional 
connectivity (which are likely to arise during learning and development) different individuals 
should have different weightings for the perceived probability of being correct and Fisher 
information on confidence. This is exactly what we saw in Fig. 3. In addition, because the 
perceived probability of being correct is encoded by domain-independent populations and 
Fisher information by domain-specific ones, the influence of perceived probability of being 
correct on confidence should be stable across domains, while the influence of Fisher 
information should be domain specific. This is exactly what we saw n in Figs. 6a and 6b, 
respectively. Based on these observations, we can make a strong prediction, one that could 
be tested with neuroimaging studies: the larger the influence of Fisher information on 
confidence, the stronger the correlation between activity in domain-specific areas and 
confidence. 
Conclusion 
The value of investigating individual differences in human behaviour and cognition was first 
recognised in the psychological sciences, with a special interest in high-level aspects such as 
intelligence33 and personality34. More recently, technical advances in magnetic resonance 
imaging have made it possible to develop a cognitive neuroscience of individual differences35, 
36. Findings include neural correlates of individual differences in motor behaviour37, visual 
perception38, mood39, social network size40, and confidence8-10. While these studies provide 
valuable insights into the neural basis of inter-individual differences in human cognition, the 
mechanisms responsible for such differences remain unknown. To overcome this limitation, 
the next challenge is to build a computational neuroscience of individual differences. A first 
step in this direction is to understand the computations performed by healthy adults leading to 
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inter-individual variability in behaviour. Our study represents the first effort to model 
differences in human confidence, paving the way towards finding how these computations 
change under development41, aging42, and psychiatric disorders43. 
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Online Methods 
Participants 
50 healthy adults (aged 18-45, 43 right-handed, 31 female) with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision participated in this study. All participants were recruited through advertisement at 
University College London, and gave written informed consent. We collected data from 84 
experimental sessions lasting approximately 90 minutes each. Participants were paid £10 per 
hour. All experimental procedures were approved by the research ethics committee at 
University College London. 
Display  
Stimuli were generated using the Cogent Toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) for 
MATLAB (Mathworks Inc). Participants observed an LCD display (21-inches monitor; refresh 
rate: 60 Hz; resolution: 1024 × 768 pixels) at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm.  
Experiment 1: Visual task 
30 participants performed Experiment 1, which consisted of an orientation averaging task (Fig. 
1). Observers viewed a sequence of 30 tilted Gabor patches over a middle grey background 
(standard deviation of the Gaussian envelope: 0.63 deg; spatial frequency: 1.57 cycles deg-1; 
contrast: 25%) flashed in rapid succession at the centre of the screen. Each patch was 
presented for 200 ms with an inter-stimulus interval of 50 ms, resulting in an update rate of 4 
Hz. Once the sequence finished, the participant was asked to judge whether the mean 
orientation of the patches was tilted clockwise or counter-clockwise relative to the vertical. The 
response alternatives consisted of two tilted lines presented in the left and right visual field 
(size: 2.2 deg, location: 11.3 deg left or right to the centre of the screen). The position of the 
response alternatives was randomly assigned and counter-balanced across trials. To select 
the option displayed in the left, participants pressed the ‘Q’ button of a QWERTY keyboard 
using the left hand; to select the option on the right, they pressed the ‘P’ button. Participants 
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were then asked to report their confidence on a rating scale from 1 to 6. A horizontal line was 
presented at the centre of the screen (length: 18.9 deg) with 6 equally-spaced marks signalling 
different levels of confidence. Participants moved a cursor to the left or right of the scale by 
pressing the ‘Q’ or ‘P’ buttons respectively. The initial point in the scale was randomly chosen 
on a trial-by-trial basis. Once the participants selected a confidence rating, they pressed the 
space bar to continue. After an inter-trial interval (which was uniformly distributed between 0.7 
and 0.9 seconds), a new trial began.  
The orientations of the patches were drawn from uniform distributions with mean m 
and endpoints m±v. We used distributions with two different means (m = +3 or -3 degrees) 
and four different variances (given by their different endpoints: v = 10, 14, 24, or 45 degrees). 
Uniform distributions were pseudo-randomly sampled such that the mean was exactly ±3 
degrees on every trial. Orientations were randomly shuffled to define the presentation order. 
The experiment consisted of 400 trials: 50 trials for each of the eight distributions. Blocked 
feedback was given every 20 trials by a message displaying the number of correct trials in that 
block. Each block comprised 5 trials of each variance condition presented in random order. 
Therefore, performance for different variance conditions could not be learned from feedback. 
Experiment 2: Stability across time 
All participants of Experiment 1 were invited to perform the visual task a second time, 
approximately one month later. 14 participants accepted the invitation and were re-tested. 
Experiment 2 was performed 35.2±2.4 days after Experiment 1 (range: 23-49 days). 
Experimenters were blind to the results of Experiment 1 when testing participants in 
Experiment 2.   
Experiment 3: Stability across the perceptual and cognitive domain 
20 healthy adults who did not participate in Experiment 1 or 2 performed Experiment 3. 
Participants performed two sessions: the visual task described in Experiment 1 and a 
numerical averaging task. Half of the participants performed the visual task first. The second 
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session was performed 9.7±2.9 days (range: 1-27 days) after the first one. Experimenters 
were blind to the results of the first session when testing the participants in the second session. 
The numerical task was identical in structure to the visual task but, instead of Gabor 
patches, two-digit numbers (size: 3.8 deg; font: Arial) were presented. The colour of the 
numbers (black or white over a middle grey background) was randomly chosen at each 
presentation. Participants were instructed to decide whether the mean of the sequence was 
greater or smaller than 50. Numbers were sampled from uniform distributions with mean m = 
47 or m = 53, and endpoints m±v were defined by v = 8, 11, 16 or 22. These values were 
chosen, through pilot experiments with a different set of participants, to obtain performances 
similar to that observed in Experiment 1. Uniform distributions were pseudo-randomly sampled 
such that the mean of the sequence was exactly m on each trial. Decisions were collected in 
the same way as in Experiment 1: a response screen with two options (“smaller” and “greater”) 
was presented on both sides of the visual field. Participants gave their answer, and indicated 
confidence, using the same keys as in the visual task.  
Model fitting 
To fit the stochastic updating model (Equations [1] and [2]) to the participants’ decisions, we 
find, for each individual, the parameters 𝜆 and 𝛾 that maximise the log likelihood, 
log 𝐿 = ∑
1 + 𝑑𝑘
2
 log Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
) +
1 − 𝑑𝑘
2
 log [1 − Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
)]
𝑁𝑡𝑟
𝑘=1
 
where Φ is the standard cumulative normal function, 𝑑𝑘 is the decision on trial 𝑘 (+1 if 
clockwise, -1 if counter-clockwise), 𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾) is obtained from Equation [2], and  
 
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆) =  𝜆 ∑(1 − 𝜆)
30−𝑖
30
𝑖=1
𝜃𝑖,𝑘 
 [4] 
 [3] 
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is the mean value of 𝜇30 on trial 𝑘. (A minor technical point: Equation [4] describes the visual 
task; the cognitive task is the same except that the mean is offset by 50.) 
Estimating the Fisher information and the perceived probability of being correct 
Based on the best fitting parameters 𝜆 and 𝛾 derived from the stochastic updating model, we 
estimated, on a trial-by-trial basis, the observed Fisher information and the expected perceived 
probability of being correct. The observed Fisher information is just the inverse variance of the 
participants’ estimate, the latter computed via Equation [2] (Fig. 2a). The expected perceived 
probability of having made a correct decision, 𝑑, is given by 
?̂?(correct|?̅?30, 𝜎30, 𝑑) = ∫ 𝑑𝜇30 ?̂?(correct|𝜇30, 𝜎30) 𝑝(𝜇30|?̅?30, 𝜎30, 𝑑) .
+∞
−∞
 
The first term inside the integral, ?̂?(correct|𝜇30, 𝜎30), is the shaded area under the Gaussian in 
Fig. 2a; consequently, it is given by the cumulative normal distribution, 
?̂?(correct|𝜇30, 𝜎30) =  Φ (
|𝜇30|
𝜎30
) . 
The second term in the integral, 𝑝(𝜇30|?̅?30, 𝜎30, 𝑑), is the probability of observing 𝜇30 given ?̅?30, 
𝜎30, and, importantly, the decision, 𝑑. If the decision is clockwise (𝑑 = +1), 𝜇30 must be 
positive, whereas if the decision is counterclockwise (𝑑 = −1), 𝜇30 must be negative. We can 
take these constraints into account using the Heaviside step function, Θ(𝑥) (which is 1 if 𝑥 > 0 
and 0 otherwise), yielding 
𝑝(𝜇30|?̅?30, 𝜎30) =  
1
𝑍
𝑒
−(𝜇30−?̅?30)
2
2𝜎30
2
√2𝜋𝜎30
2
Θ(𝜇30𝑑) 
where 𝑍 is the normalisation constant,  
𝑍 = ∫  𝑑𝜇30Θ(𝜇30𝑑)
𝑒
−(𝜇30−?̅?30)
2
2𝜎30
2
√2𝜋𝜎30
2
= Φ (
?̅?30 𝑑
𝜎30
).  
+∞
−∞
 
 [5] 
 [6] 
 [7] 
 [8] 
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Combining these two expressions, we have 
?̂?(correct|?̅?30, 𝜎30, 𝑑) =  
1
𝑍
∫ 𝑑𝜇30
𝑒
−(𝜇30−?̅?30)
2
2𝜎30
2
√2𝜋𝜎30
2
Θ(𝜇30𝑑) Φ (
|𝜇30|
𝜎30
)
+∞
−∞
. 
On each trial, ?̂?(correct|?̅?30, 𝜎30, 𝑑) was computed numerically using Matlab. Note that 
the expected perceived probability of being correct (Equation [9]) is dependent on the 
decision, 𝑑, whereas the Fisher information (Equation [2], Fig.2a) is choice-independent. 
Ordinal regression of confidence reports 
We ran for each individual a multivariate ordinal regression23. For each of the five possible 
splits in the rating scale, this regression fits a logistic model with fixed effects and different 
offsets,  
log (
𝑝(𝑐 > 𝑗)
1 − 𝑝(𝑐 > 𝑗)
) = −𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝𝑍𝑝 + 𝛽𝐼𝑍𝐼 
where 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 5, 𝑐 denotes confidence, and 𝑍𝑝 and 𝑍𝐼 are z-scored estimates of the perceived 
probability of being correct and Fisher information on each trial. The outputs of this regression 
are the offsets 𝛼1, … , 𝛼5, and the weights 𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝐼. To summarise the computations 
underlying confidence, we selected 𝛼3 (the offset when splitting the scale in halves, which we 
refer to as the average confidence), 𝛽𝑝 (the weight of the probability of being correct on 
confidence) and 𝛽𝐼 (the weight of information on confidence).  
 
 
 
Does model fitting explain our findings? 
 [10] 
 [9] 
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We asked if individual differences in how well our model fitted decisions could explain inter-
individual variability in the parameters 𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝐼 , and 𝛼3. To do this, we correlated these values 
with the observed maximum log-likelihood,  
ℒ = max
𝜆,𝛾
 log𝐿, 
where log 𝐿 is obtained using Equation [3].  We observed that ℒ was not significantly 
correlated with 𝛽𝐼 (r=0.27, p=0.15) or 𝛼3 (r=0.26, p=0.15); however, we did observe a positive 
correlation between ℒ and 𝛽𝑝 (r=0.59, p<0.001). This could potentially mean that, for subjects 
with a low 𝛽𝑝, decisions were not well explained by our model (Equation [1]). Alternatively, 
because ℒ is positively correlated with the mean accuracy across the entire session (r=0.71, 
p<10-4), it could reflect that these participants behaved more randomly. To test this possibility, 
we computed the expected log-likelihood under the assumption of a perfect fit, 
〈ℒ〉 = ∑ Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
) log [Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
)] + (1 − Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
)) log [1 − Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
)] ,
𝑁𝑡𝑟
𝑘=1
 
and measured the quality of the fit using the deviance, 𝐷 =  −2(ℒ − 〈ℒ〉). All three parameters 
were uncorrelated with 𝐷 (r=0.22, p=0.24 for 𝛽𝑝; r=-0.12, p=0.54 for 𝛽𝐼; r=0.24, p=0.19 for 𝛼3), 
and 𝐷 was uncorrelated with average performance (r=0.22, p=0.23). This indicates that 
individual differences in 𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝐼 , and 𝛼3 are not explained by inter-individual variability in the 
goodness of the fit. 
Comparison with other measures of confidence 
We measured the ability to discriminate correct from incorrect trials (also known as 
“metacognitive ability”) using an approach inspired by signal detection theory: we computed 
the type-2 area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC2)44. Given a set of 
confidence ratings from 1 to 6, there are 5 possible “criterions” to classify trials as having “low” 
or “high” confidence. The AUROC2 is constructed by measuring the area under the curve 
defined by the hit rate (i.e., the proportion of correct trials that were reported with high 
 [11] 
 [12] 
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confidence) versus the false alarm rate (i.e., the proportion of incorrect trials that were reported 
with high confidence). 𝛽𝑝 correlated with the AUROC2 (r=0.53, p<0.01). 
We also estimated the participants’ ability to discriminate different conditions. To this 
end, we obtained the distributions of ratings at each variance condition, and computed their 
Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence11. The JS divergence between two distributions 𝑃 and 𝑄 is 
𝐷JS(𝑃, 𝑄) = 0.5 𝐷KL (𝑃|
𝑃 + 𝑄
2 ) + 0.5 𝐷KL (𝑄|
𝑃 + 𝑄
2 ) 
where 𝐷KL(𝑃|𝑄) is the Kullback-Leibler
45 divergence between 𝑃 and 𝑄, 
𝐷KL(𝑃|𝑄) = ∑ 𝑃𝑗 log
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝑗
 .
𝑗
 
For each participant, we computed the distribution of confidence ratings at each of the 
four variance levels, and averaged the Jensen-Shannon divergences across all pairs. 𝛽𝐼 was 
correlated with this quantity (r=0.86, p<10-8). 
Statistical analyses 
In Experiment 1, we computed the average performance for each variance condition and each 
participant. These values were submitted to a one-way repeated measures analysis of 
variance (rm-ANOVA) with factor “variance condition” (4 levels) and “participant” (30 levels) 
as repeated measure (Fig. 1). The normality assumption of this test was checked using the 
Lilliefors test (k=0.7, c=0.8, p=0.07). We also computed the average confidence rating for each 
variance condition and each participant, conditioned on correct or incorrect trials, and 
submitted those values to a two-way rm-ANOVA with factors “variance condition” (4 levels), 
“outcome” (2 levels: correct or incorrect), and “participant” (30 levels) as repeated measure 
(Fig. 2c). The normality assumption of this test was checked using the Lilliefors test (k=0.04, 
c=0.06, p>0.5). The goodness of the fit for each model and subject (Supplementary Fig. 1b), 
quantified by the negative log-likelihood (Equation [3]), was submitted to a two-sided paired t-
test (29 degrees of freedom). The normality assumption of this test was checked using the 
Lilliefors test (k=0.08, c=0.11, p>0.5). 
 [13] 
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In Experiment 2, we compared the within-participants distances in the space defined 
by (𝛽𝑝,𝛽𝐼,𝛼3) with the between-subjects distances. Because we have 14 participants, this 
defines 14 within-subjects distances and 14×13/2=91 between-subjects distances. We z-
scored each dimension and used the Euclidean metric to compute distance. The Lilliefors test 
rejected the null hypothesis that these values were normal (k=0.1, c=0.08, p=0.01); therefore, 
we used a non-parametric test, the Wilcoxon ranked sum test. This test is unpaired and the 
reported p-value is two-sided. 
In Experiment 3, we computed the average performance for each variance condition, 
task, and participant (Fig. 5a,b). We submitted these values to a two-way rm-ANOVA with 
factors “variance condition” (4 levels), “task” (2 levels), and “participants” (20 levels) as 
repeated measure. The normality assumption of this test was checked using the Lilliefors test 
(k=0.07, c=0.09, p=0.36). We computed the average confidence rating across all conditions 
and participants and performed the same rm-ANOVA used in Experiment 1 (Fig. 5c,d). As in 
Experiment 1, average confidence was normally distributed (Lilliefors test, k=0.06, c=0.07, 
p=0.17). To evaluate the stability of (𝛽𝑝,𝛽𝐼,𝛼3) across domains, we computed the within- and 
between-subjects distances following the same procedure of Experiment 2, and compared 
these values using the same non-parametric test. 
Data and code availability 
The data and codes that support our findings are available upon request to the corresponding 
author. 
44. Fleming, S. M. & Lau, H. C. How to measure metacognition. Frontiers in human 
neuroscience 8 (2014).  
45. Kullback, S. & Leibler, R. A. On information and sufficiency. Annals of Mathematical 
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Supplementary Figure 1. Model fitting results. We fit two probabilistic models that make different assumptions 
about how decisions are made. The stochastic updating (SU) model is described in the main text (Equations [1] 
and [2]). In the stochastic decisions (SD) model, the agent makes deterministic updates, 
𝜇𝑖 = (1 − 𝜆) 𝜇𝑖−1 + 𝜆 𝜃𝑖 
 and then makes a softmax decision,  
𝑝(𝐶𝑊) =
exp(−𝛾 𝜇30)
exp(−𝛾 𝜇30) + exp(𝛾 𝜇30)
  
where 𝑝(𝐶𝑊) is the probability of choosing clockwise and 𝛾 is the inverse temperature of the softmax rule. In this 
model, the agent updates perfectly and uses a stochastic (and thus suboptimal) rule for action selection; errors are 
due to noise in the decisional stage. In the SU model, the updating process is stochastic (Equation [1] in the main 
text), and decisions are optimal based on the perceived estimate; errors are due to uncertainty in the updating 
process. Both models fit two parameters (𝜆 and 𝛾) to the data of each individual. a) The SU model (solid line) but 
not the SD model (dotted line) fits the pattern of increasing performance with decreasing variance. b) Model 
comparison: negative log likelihood of the SU and SD models using the best fitting parameters. Each dot is a 
different participant. The SU model fits the data significantly better than the SD model (t(29)=9.0, p<10-9). c) 
Distribution of best fitting parameters 𝜆 in the SU model across participants. d) Distribution of best fitting parameters 
𝛾 in the SU model across participants.  
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Supplementary Figure 2. Analysis of confidence across domains. The plot shows regression weights on 
confidence for different individuals. x-axis: weight of the probability of being correct (𝛽𝑝); y-axis: weight of 
information (𝛽𝐼). Each marker (circle, diamond, or square) represents one experiment. The colour codes for 
significance (at the 0.05 level) are as follows: dark green, only 𝛽𝑝 was significant; light green, both 𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝐼 were 
significant; yellow, only 𝛽𝐼 was significant; grey, neither was significant. Circles: 30 participants performing the 
visual task in Experiment 1. Diamonds: 20 other participants performing the visual task in Experiment 3. Squares: 
the same 20 participants of Experiment 3 performing the numerical averaging task.  
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Supplementary Figure 3. Experiment 3: Stability within each experiment for the visual (a-c) and numerical (d-f) 
task.  For each half of the experiment (200 trials each), we decomposed confidence in terms of the weight of 
?̂?(correct) (𝛽𝑝), the weight of information (𝛽𝐼), and the constant term 𝛼3. Correlation across halves for 𝛽𝑝 (a/d), 𝛽𝐼 
(b/e), and 𝛼3 (c/f). Each square is a different participant, the dotted line is the identity, and the value of r given in 
each box is the Pearson correlation coefficient. All three variables are stable within each experiment for both the 
visual and numerical task. 
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